Introduction
This study extends the literature that explores how social and group organization can be used for the purpose of influencing group choice. The theme is captured by the word "influence" but the emphasis is on the word "how". The research purpose is to provide insights into organization that exhibits substantial influence on group choices and the behavioral principles through which the influence can work. Riker 1 (1986) coined the term "heresthetics" to describe the art of political manipulation but "committee karate" or "organization karate" might be a more descriptive term 2 . Axiomatic social choice theory and recent developments in the theory of cooperative games are used as the foundation for the theory and results. Laboratory experimental methods are used.
The problem is easy to state. An organization consisting of a group of people (ten in our case) must choose one option from a set of options (fifteen in our case). Individual preferences differ; are well formed with certainty and are not publically known. Individual preferences are partially known to an administrator, possibly as a result of interviews and private conversations or other sources available to administrators. The administrator has personal preferences over the group choice; cannot change the preference or voting behavior of any of the group members; cannot dictate the choice but has the power to dictate decision procedures used by the group.
The objective is to design an organization, a "mechanism", which will produce as an outcome the alternative that the administrator wants. A successful mechanism, the one to be studied here, is easy to describe. It consists of two independent decision making centers, viewed as subcommittees, each of which chooses from among a subset of the options and the two choices are elevated to a vote by the organization as a whole. With the mechanism in place, the administrator influences the ultimate choice through the assignment of members to the centers/subcommittees and the options (the committee charges) from which the centers/committees must choose. The research demonstrates that the administrator can configure the organization to choose almost anything he/she wants.
The experiments consist of a fixed set of options and fixed preferences of the organization's individual members, which remain unchanged throughout the experiments. Two different mechanisms are studied. One is based on a majority rule equilibration model and the other is based on a veto player game model. A set of target options is designated and tested in a series of trials. For each of the designated targets the theory is applied in a trial, to craft an organization and procedures to influence the group to choose the target option while leaving all individual 1 William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 2 Riker emphasized the role of language in addition to institutions and procedures as an important ingredient of the art of heresthetics. The emphasis of committee karate is on organizational structure. The influence of procedures on committee decisions is well established. See Plott and Levine (1977) ; Levine and Plott (1978) committee members preferences unchanged. 3 The experiments demonstrate that the target option of a trial tends to be the group choice as predicted.
The experiments are structured to answer two broad questions. 4 (1) The first is a proof of principle. Does the mechanism do what it is supposed to do? Basically, does the mechanism produce the group choices that it was designed to get? (2) The second is design consistency. Does the mechanism operate according to the principles on which the design rests? The underlying principles are important for reliability and scalability. If the success is accidental then there is no reason to think that the mechanism can be scaled in terms of size or environment.
Two levels of theory are studied. One level applies to the behavior of centers-subcommittees when operating in isolation. The theory addresses how a subcommittee choice can be predictably influenced by the use of theories of cooperative games, majority rule equilibrium and the core. The second level applies to the relationship between different parts of an organization, the "centers", and addresses the properties of institutions needed to assure that subcommittee decisions are insulated from each other thus avoiding unwanted influence of coalitions, communication, and other variables that game theory and experiments demonstrate are important. The tools are derived from axiomatic social choice theory.
The design diverges from the traditional theory of mechanism design. The application resides in a world that consists only of public goods so private goods transfers are not possible. The design is derived by voting theory and cooperative game theory as opposed to non-cooperative games and Nash equilibria. The social goals of the mechanism design are externally imposed. The objective is to induce the group to choose according to the preferences of the designer, as opposed to the classical objectives of efficiency or welfare optimization. The divorce from tradition motivates an additional goal. A process design that successfully manipulates should itself be perceived as being "fair" even though the goals implemented and the mechanism itself might be strongly rejected if the decision making body's informed opinion were to be consulted about design objectives. Tensions exist between the designer and the participants as well as between traditional welfare economics and the idea of committee karate.
Results from the experiments demonstrate that institutions suggested by theory can be readily implemented and perform substantially as predicted by theory. The outcomes tended to be controlled and dictated according to the institutional design. The theory itself predicted that the institutions would not be completely successful in manipulating outcomes. An "error prone" tendency exists but is also predicted by theory. That is, the theory predicted instances of less than perfect success that are confirmed by observation.
Overview
The institutional design operates at an organizational decision level where decentralized decision centers can be created and coordinated. Section 3 contains notation used to connect social choice theory and cooperative game theory. Section 4 is an example. Section 5 develops the institutional structure and behavioral theory for centers where voting takes place and individual decisions are key features. The major tool is cooperative game theory in effectiveness form. The section also develops theory at an "organizational" or "decentralized" level for the control of multiple centers. From the point of view of manipulation the natural tendency toward coalitions and coordination predicted by game theory creates a potential for a form of institutional evolution or "institutional invasion" that must be controlled and channeled in order to keep the organizational influence on the design track. For this purpose, the theory uses classical social choice theory.
The overall idea is simple. A social goal or "target" is identified and the organization is structured to produce the target as the group decision. The "organization chart" that explains the decision center organization is illustrated in Figure 1 . The administrator creates two decision centers (subcommittees), assigns the membership, and defines the task of each. Each subcommittee will convene to choose one element from the set of options defined as the committee's task. The procedure used by the subcommittees is strict majority rule according to a simplified version of Roberts Rules of Order with the default designated by the administrator that is to be chosen by the committee in the event the committee fails to choose any other alternative. The two options that emerge as the two committee choices will then be voted on by the committee of the whole. Two committee mechanisms reflecting different committee rules are tested, each of which produces the committee target as the core of an underlying game.
Section 6 outlines the experimental testbed, the induced preferences and the details of the institutions. The logic of the testbed is simply to create an institutional and preference environment and ask, through a series of tests, if the social choices respond as predicted. Section 7 contains the precise predictions of the model when applied to the testbed. As stated in the introduction, the questions are whether or not the mechanism does what it is supposed to do and whether or not it does it for the right reasons. Section 8 reports the details of the experimental procedures.
Section 9 is a statement of results. Overall, the process worked well to produce the target alternatives. The models tended to match the data. Section 10 is a summary of results. Appendices contain details of preference inducement and aspects of the technologies used in experiments.
Notation, Institutions and Solution Concepts
A social choice function represents the theoretically predicted outcomes of a decision process expressed as a function of the environment. The environment consists of the feasible alternatives, individual preferences, decision making rules and status quo. The choice itself is a subset of the possible outcomes, interpreted as the solution of an underlying game as defined by the environment.
A. Notation Y = a universal set of conceivable alternatives over which individuals have preferences. X = the set of feasible alternatives available and from which a choice is made. The set of feasible alternatives is a subset of the set of conceivable alternatives, X Y. N = the set of all individuals iN R i = the preference relation of individual i N, with x R i y or as x ' i y. Where R is the set of all total preorders over Y, R i  R and (R 1 ,…,R N )  R N . Let D be all asymmetric and irreflexive binary relations on Y. For a dominance relation D D, xDy means x "dominates" y in a sense to be made more precise later. A social dominance function, D(R 1 ,…,R N )  R N , is a mapping that assigns to each vector of preferences (R 1 ,…,R N )  R N a dominance relation.
A (game form) social choice function, C(X, x 0 , D(R 1 ,..R i ,..R N )) X, is defined by the following properties: (i) a set of options X, (ii) a "status quo", x 0 , which assures that the outcome will be one of the alternatives as opposed to the empty set, (iii) a vector of individual preferences (R 1 ,…,R N ), and (iv) a dominance relation D(R 1 ,…,R N ) reflecting the underlying rules the group choice.
B. Institutions
Institutions reflect the rules of the game, the game form, and are represented by winning and blocking coalitions in a game in effectiveness form. 5 For the analysis developed here the rules, the winning and blocking coalitions, are fixed in the sense that they do not change as the preferences of a decision making group change.
We say that a coalition c  N is a "winning" coalition if the rules grant the coalition the power to implement any element of the set of options , X, as the social choice. The concept is defined relative to some fixed set of options X and its subsets. Thus, the winning coalitions given a set of options X need not be the same as the winning coalitions given a disjoint set Y. The games we will consider are "proper" games in the sense that if c is a winning coalition then its complement is not winning. A "blocking" coalition is a subset of every winning coalition. W = cN such that c is a winning coalition. So if cW, then , c  = N\c and c   W. 5 The basic connection with cooperative game theory in environments with public goods and no side payments evolves from Robert W. Rosenthal (1972) . B = cN such that if bB the bc for all cW. 6 It follows that if a coalition, c, is blocking for a pair (x,y) in X then it is blocking for all pairs in X.
The concept of "dominance" is derived from the abstract concepts of "power" and "preference" of coalitions c N. The concept of "power" reflects the nature of institutions or the "rules of the game" as defined by the concepts of winning and blocking coalitions. Alternative x "dominates" alternative y, written xDy, if there exists a winning coalition that unanimously prefers x to y.
More generally if D(R 1 ,..R i ,..R N ) is a dominance function as defined by decision making rules then xDy, if there exists a winning coalition that unanimously prefers x to y given the preferences (R 1 ,..R i ,..R N ).
C. Game Solutions as System Choice 7
The restriction that the social choice be a subset of the feasible set of options, X, suggests that the social choice construction can be connected to various notions of equilibria resulting from the process such as "game solutions". For this paper only one solution concept will be used (the core of the game). While other solution concepts 8 exist, only the core is used here.
The core is the set of x in X that are undominated: Core = {xX: for all y X, yDx}. So the social choice is the core if C(X, x 0 , D (R 1 ,..R i ,..R N )= {xX: for all y X, yDx}. 6 The concept of blocking can be interpreted as flowing from group rights. While concepts of individual and group rights are not studied here, generalizations open the door for additional applications of committee karate. Blocking coalitions can be defined relative to pairs of options. If blocking is defined relative to pairs, some of the restrictions of simple games are relaxed and the concept of blocking can become connected to a wider spectrum of institutions. Let (x,y) be the set of coalitions for which x cannot dominate y unless the coalition prefers x to y. That is, if a coalition c is an element (x,y) then the system cannot move from y to x (or "move to consider" x over y) unless all members of c prefer x to y. Notice that the family of coalitions in (x,y) can change as the pair (x,y) changes and that the agents that have blocking power over (x,y) might have no blocking power or influence over the different pair (w,z). Such a representation is natural when the options are divided for choice among different subcommittees where the subcommittees are viewed as participating in different games.
The structure of (x,y) can be used to define individual and group rights. For example, if one postulates that i is in all c in (x,z) for all z, then i can prevent moves to x (the system cannot move to x unless i agrees) or in (z,x) for all z, which means that the system cannot move away from x unless c agrees (if the system gets to x it cannot move away from x unless i agrees). The concept reflects a type of "private rights". One can think of x as having some dimension (such as a good or activity to be allocated or some type of externality) that affects i. The concept can be refined further to reflect sets of options (i) and (i) over which i has such control. That is, the relation xDy is blocked if x (i) and i does not prefer x to y and the relation yDx is blocked if x(i) and i does not prefer y to x. Hammond (1997) makes this distinction in terms one way rights and two way rights. The concepts extend themselves to the rights of groups and in doing so can be used to formalize the concept of an "amendment control rule" found in Shepsle (1979) and in Shepsle and Weingast (1984) . Additional, powerful rules that impact the structure of blocking powers derived from parliamentary procedures are found in Schwartz (2006 Schwartz ( , 2008 .
Generalization can also be achieved through a relaxation of dominance to the case where blocking coalition is indifferent. For example, such a change of definition would be needed to allow exchanges between others, i.e. changes of the social state that do not change the component over which an individual has rights. 7 The connection between the social preference as found in social choice theory and dominance as found in cooperative game theory is first introduced by Wilson (1972) . 8 An example is the Von Neuman Morgenstern solution. It is a set, VM X : {x,y VM  xDy and yDx}{ y VM  x VM such that xDy} The VM solutions can be families of sets. Other solution concepts are outlined for committee process in Isaac and Plott (1978) .
Since N and X are finite it can easily be shown that the core is non empty if a blocking coalition exists. Of particular importance is a special institutional structure that Brown (1973) identifies as a collegium in which the blocking coalition becomes a winning coalition by being joined with select, disjoint subsets of the individuals.
D. Design Goals and Objectives
The concept of design reflects an effort to find underlying processes such that for every situation of feasible alternatives and individual preferences the resulting equilibria, the social choice, is what the designer wants the outcome to be. The goals of the design can be specified as a choice function representing what the social choice "should be" (or "should not be") according to the criteria of the designer. Where X  Y, the goals can be represented as S( X, x 0 , R 1 ,..R i ,..R N ) X. The design objective can be stated as S being equal to the social choice S( X, x 0 , R 1 ,..R i ,..R N ) = C(X, x 0 , D (R 1 ,..R i ,..R N ))  X . The criteria of success could be stated as a subset, superset or non intersection as oppose to the equality sign, S(.) =C(.). The subtle distinction plays a role in the concept of "error" when assessing the accuracy of the design. In the sections that follow a goal of equality will be assumed so the nature of all model errors can be measured and examined.
An Example: Theory Applied to a Single Committee
The process to be studied consists of "centers" that operate separately and can be modeled as separate committees. This section analyzes one such decision center. The entire process to be tested is outlined in the next section, Section 5.
Consider a committee of three people, {1,2,3}, that must decide on one of three feasible alternatives, {x,y,z} and have preferences: {1: xy z; 2: xzy; 3: zyx}.The majority rule preference order is a transitive binary relation, xzy.
Two concepts are central. The first concept, taken from voting theory and social choice theory, is that of a Condorcet winner. A Condorcet winner is an alternative that, when compared to any other alternative, is strictly preferred by a majority. It would beat all other options in a head to head majority vote. In the example the Condorcet winner is x.
The second concept is the core of a dominance relation. As explained previously, from the perspective of cooperative game theory, the concept of dominance follows from the conjunction of power and preference. In the special case of majority rule, every majority has the power to implement anything and thus is a winning coalition. An alternative is said to dominate if every member in a winning coalition prefers to . We denote dominates as x D y. In the example, every majority has the power to implement anything in the set {x,y,z} and is thus a "winning coalition". Given the individual preferences, the dominance relation is x D z, x D y and z D y. The core is the set of undominated alternatives. By contrast a Condorcet winner is not only unbeaten, it dominates all other alternatives. So, in this example, if the vote is strictly according to majority rule and there are no ties and voting is on all pairs of alternatives (to be referred to as the open rule), the core is x and it is also the Condorcet winner.
A matrix representation of binary relations will be a useful tool. The dominance relation for simple majority rule is represented by the matrix M in Figure 2 in which the cell (,) is 1 if D and it is -1 if D. If the cell (,) is 0, then no dominance exists between the pair. In the matrix representation, a row with only non-negative entries represents an undominated alternative. The row for x in the matrix M has no negative entries and thus x is in the core. The absence of negative entries means nothing dominates x.
Consider now an alternative process that operates by majority rule but the rules give individual 3 blocking power in the sense that the rules put individual 3 in every winning coalition. That is, that no majority coalition can exercise its power unless individual 3 is in favor of it but the preference of individual 3 must be backed by a majority in order to establish dominance. Dominance between a pair, for instance, x and y, requires a majority preference plus the preference of individual 3 so individual 3 alone does not constitute a winning coalition. In the matrix notation, the majority preference is represented by the matrix M and the preference of individual 3 is represented by C and the dominance relation is derived by adding M and C to get the matrix M+C. Recall that dominance requires unanimity of members of a winning coalition. As before if the cell (,) is 1 if D and it is -1 if D. An alternative is undominated if its associated row contains only non-negative elements. In the matrix, M+C the rows associated with x and z have only non-negative elements and thus the core is the pair {x,z}. The dominance relation is only zDy because #3 and the majority prefer z to y but for all other pairs the majority is blocked because the preference of #3 is the opposite of the majority. The alternative y is dominated by z but both x and z are undominated.
Note that if a blocking coalition is a single person, as will be the case in much of the theory applied in the paper, then the most preferred alternative of that person is always in the core. The row of the most preferred alternative of the blocking individual contains no negative elements in the matrix representation (the Z row for individual 3 in our example). These negative elements cancel any of the elements derived from the other players, which by construction are only 0 or 1. The most preferred alternative of the blocking player cannot be dominated and is thus in the core. The procedures that create the blocking power will come from an ability to block options from being voted on and will be referred to as the "closed rule". The theory and techniques generalize naturally to cases in which the blocking coalition contains more than one individual.
An Organization Designed for Outcome Control: Structure and Supporting Theory
The design for outcome control can be understood in terms of an organization chart; consisting of (i) decision centers, (ii) the powers, charges or tasks assigned to decision centers, (iii) individual assignments to decision centers, and (iv) procedures to be followed within decision centers.
A. Institution Representations
Following the social choice approach, institutions that capture the basic structure of the organization are represented as properties of a social choice function and are thus represented in axiomatic form 9 . Institutions as well as the solution concept are abstract unless accompanied organizational details.
a. Decision Centers. The jurisdictions, the tasks assigned to decision centers, are fixed sets of options from which the center must choose one alternative. Jurisdictions do not overlap.
Let N k be the individuals assigned to the decision center k and let X k be the jurisdiction of center k. Thus X k is the set of alternatives assigned to the center and the task (the charge or jurisdiction) of the center is to produce a choice from the feasible set of alternatives assigned to it. The jurisdiction assigned to k is a subset of a larger set of options, X, available to the organization as a whole, X k X Y.
Members of the decision center apply their own preferences. Assume R i is the preference relation for iN k . The vector of preferences of the individuals of the center is (R 1 ,..R i ,..R Nk ) = (R i , iN k ). In addition, it has a default option x k  X k , which is the choice of the committee should the deliberations of the committee lead to no decision. For purposes of design and modeling, we can represent the decision center k as a choice function.
. Decision Center Autonomy: Predictability and control of center choices requires that the decision centers operate with autonomy, independently from each other and from other parts of the organization. 10 The condition requires that the blocking powers of a decision center do not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the center and that for pairs of options in the jurisdiction only members of the center are members of winning coalitions. Autonomy requires that decisions made by members of a center do not anticipate or attempt to influence decisions in other centers. Subgroup meetings, or caucuses by subgroups of a given center or multiple centers, are not allowed.
The intent of the organizational design is for centers to operate and be modeled as independent subgames. Indeed, the autonomy of centers is an important element that supports a type of "divide and conquer" strategy on which committee karate is based. The next axiom, which will 9 The use of an axiomatic form of institutional representations reflects an attempt to capture the essence of an institution that can be used in models as opposed to the verbal and rule intensive facts that are used to describe institutions in naturally occurring environments. Several types of voting rules have complete axiomatic descriptions. (See Fishburn (1973) , Austin-Smith and Banks (1999 Banks ( , 2004 , Moulin (1998) , and Aleskerov and Suborchy (2013) ). 10 The rich and variable possibilities of coalition formation are reviewed by Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra (2014, forthcoming) .
The structure of the theory predicts that coalition formation is a natural tendency that can occur spontaneously in groups. The role of the axiom is to capture the existence of institutions that prevent their formation. Similarly, the intent of the axiom is to capture the existence of institutions and information control that prevent strategic voting that is known to occur naturally. (See Bonoit, 2006) . be very familiar to social choice theorists, 11 captures that property and is a necessary condition for "implementability" in the sense of social choice functions.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IFA):
If R = (R 1 ,…,R N ) are preferences over Y and if XY and if R  = R\X then C(X, x 0 ,R) = C(X, x 0 , R  ). R\X indicates the restriction of R to the elements of X, i.e. [ for all i and for all x,y X, xR i y x R  i y].
A decision center is said to act with autonomy if its choice function satisfies IFA. If the choice function satisfies IFA then the outcome of the choice is not influenced by individual preferences for items that are not feasible. The power of this axiom is to rule out strategic behavior in decisions over subsets that will subsequently be part of another choice or rule out the influence of decisions made by other decision centers. The axiom also rules out certain types of "strength of preference" variables other than what might be reflected in a marginal rate of substitution.
Operationally, this property should be guaranteed by the organization in which the decision center resides. The model is neutral about exactly what institutions guarantee the property and instead, represents the institutions in terms of the properties of the choice function. If the institutions do not guarantee choice behavior that satisfies IFA, then the model may not work.
c. Assignment of Individuals to Decision Centers
Membership in a decision center is assigned. Self-selection is not allowed. It means that only the preferences of the group assigned to the center are the individual preferences that determine the center's outcome. Preferences of individuals not assigned to the center do not influence the choice made by the center.
The organization of a decision center reflects two properties. First, only those assigned to the decision center contribute to the choice function. Second, due to IFA, the decision center's choice is insensitive to changes in the preferences of individuals outside the center. It is also insensitive to changes in members' preferences for options that are outside the center's jurisdiction.
d. Committee Procedures
Procedures are assigned to decision centers and cannot be changed by the center. The procedures begin with the status quo placed as the motion on the floor. The floor is open for amendments, which much be recognized and seconded. An amendment that passes a strict majority becomes the motion on the floor. If a proposed amendment fails to get a strict majority the motion on the floor remains.
Any member of the committee can seek recognition and if recognized, places an amendment. If multiple members seek recognition within the timeframe, recognition is exercised through an independent, equally likely random draw. Any motion can be proposed at any time. In particular, a motion that just failed can be proposed again.
e. Motion Seconds, the Role of Chairman and open rules vs closed rule procedures. All motions require a second. Two different rules are implemented for study and form the basis of the two different mechanisms. Under conditions of the open rule (a type of Roberts Rules), any member of the committee, other than the member that made the proposal, can second the motion. Once the motion is seconded, it goes directly to a vote by the committee. Under the closed rule or Committee Chairman sessions, only the chairman has the power to second. Any motion recognized is proposed, but only those motions that are seconded by the chairman can proceed to a vote by the committee. Motions not seconded fail and the floor is open for new motions.
f. Ending rules. Any committee member recognized can propose to end the debate and vote on the motion on the floor as the final choice. The motion must receive a second in order to be voted on. The second can come from any member of the committee that is not the proposer.
g. Role of status quo. Should the committee fail to make a decision, the status quo is chosen. The decision process starts at the status quo. If any motion passes, the decision process moves away from the status quo so the status quo will not be chosen unless it is proposed and returns as the motion on the floor.
If only two options exist, then a tie after repeated votes results in the choice of the status quo.
B. The Model of Organizational Choice and Behavior
Let the set or options available to the organization be XY, and partition the X into two sets, X A and X B . Choose two defaults, x 0A and x 0B plus x 0 , which is the default for the committee of the whole. Let N be the members of the organization and partition them into two sets N A and N B . The organizational decision process consists of two separate subcommittees plus a committee of the whole. Subcommittees chose an alternative from their jurisdictions, respectively, and report the decisions to the committee of the whole. The committee of the whole then decides from the narrowed set of two options chosen by the subcommittees respectively. The organizational structure is formally represented as:
The theory applied to manipulation and design is direct. Clearly, the organizational structure should be such that all committees operate with autonomy. The committee as a whole should be faced with two alternatives. One of which is the alternative preferred by the designer and is an alternative that will be defeated by a majority vote when placed against the alternative preferred by the designer. Thus the designer must know some options that the target option can beat in a majority contest.
The focus of the design then folds back to the creation of subcommittee processes that will lead to the presentation of the appropriate alternatives, from the point of view of the designer, to the committee of the whole. To these ends, the designer chooses subcommittee tasks and subcommittee membership such that the core of each subcommittee is the alternative that the designer wants that subcommittee to choose. In essence, the target consists of the alternatives, one for each subcommittee and one of those two for the committee of the whole.
The Experimental Testbed
The testbed proceeds in a series of periods. In each period, a target is designated and a group decision is made. From period to period, the set of alternatives and the set of preferences that exist in the overall group do not change. However, as the target changes, the committee assignments and committee jurisdictions change such that the underlying model predicts that the target will be the option chosen by the group. The two research questions (i) and (ii) above, are answered by a study of the success rate with which the target alternative are chosen and by the capacity of the model to explain the behaviors exhibited by individuals and by groups in the voting.
The set of fifteen alternatives X = {A,B,….,O} remains fixed throughout the testbed, although as will be explained in the appendix, the labels are jumbled throughout the testbed to mask identical test situations from subjects. Preference types are induced. The set of preference types, T = {1,2,…,10}, in the environment are fixed throughout the experiment, although as explained in the appendix, the preference types are rotated among subjects to prevent obvious issues of long term strategies that could otherwise link tests. The preference types are contained in Table 1 . Each type has a strict preference ordering over the fifteen alternatives as contained in the figure.
The monetary incentives associated with the preference orderings are in Table 3 and will be explained in detail in Appendix 3. The preference types are illustrated in a two dimensional spatial configuration in Figure 3 .
The fact that the options and preference types are fixed throughout the testbed means that the majority rule "preference" or "dominance relation" remains fixed throughout all parts of the testbed. The majority rule preference is contained in Table 2 . Of significance is the fact that a Condorcet winner exists among all alternatives and preference types. Option A is preferred by a majority to any other option. Furthermore, the strict majority rule preference is acyclic in the sense that it contains no preference cycles. However, the majority rule preference order is not strictly transitive since it can be that x is preferred to y and y to z but x ties with z under majority rule given the even number of people.
The existence of a Condorcet winner among all alternatives plays two background roles. First, it is an attractive theory of behavior and in ordinary majority rule settings the Condorcet winner is known to serve well as a theory of equilibrium. The ability to design an organization that consistently and predictably choose some alternative other than the Condorcet winner is a measure of organizational control and the power of the underlying influence model. Secondly, majority rule preference acclivity provides a measure of organizational influence and control since intuition suggests that the process would naturally equilibrate "up" toward the Condorcet winner, which is alternative A.
With the intuitive theory of dynamics and social preference in mind, the power of the theory can be appreciated. In the course of the testbed, various alternatives other than the overall Condorcet winner, alternative A, will be designated as a target and when so designated will be the alternative chosen by the relevant decision center/ subcommittee.
A. Testbed Structure
The testbed design is outlined in Figure 4 . Two separate, identical experiments were conducted. Each experiment consisted of ten subjects, ten preference types, and fifteen alternatives. The pattern of preferences for all fifteen alternatives was identical across both experiments. One alternative was designated as the status quo. It was the least preferred alternative by all preference types. Each experiment consisted of two separate sessions, specified by the underlying models, assignments and procedures used to accomplish control: a Condorcet Mechanism and a Chairman Mechanism. Each of the two sessions focused on the ability of the mechanism to influence the organization to choose the specified target, which the organization was designed to choose. As will be discussed below, from the point of view of design the implementation of the Condorcet Mechanism required more information about individual preferences than does the Chairman Mechanism.
The broad organizational framework was the same for all experiments and all sessions. Two subcommittees (Subcommittee 1 and Subcommittee 2) were created consisting of five members each. Committee jurisdictions consisted of seven alternatives each and the subcommittees were charged with choosing one option from the jurisdiction assigned to the subcommittee. Subcommittee choices were transmitted to a committee of the group as a whole, which made the final decision from the two options presented to it. This final decision served as the basis for payment to all subjects.
Five different group targets were chosen in each of the two sessions (the Condorcet Mechanism and the Chairman Mechanism) for each of the two experiments. The core was the behavioral model used to configure subcommittee organizations that would result in the group target as the final choice of the committee as a whole. Since the final decision depended on the choices made by subcommittees, the selection of a group target implied a selection of a target for each of the two subcommittees in addition to the target for the group when acting as a whole. The organization was configured such that the subgroup target was an element of the core and each subgroup choice contributes to the overall test of the underlying behavioral model.
Thus, within a session as defined by the mechanism (Condorcet or Chairman), each of the five group targets actually decomposed into three (sub) targets. Tests were replicated three times for each of the five group targets producing 15 decisions for each of the three choosing groups within a session. That is, a session consisted of three choosing groups (two subcommittees and a committee of the whole) so each session produced 45 committee decisions (fifteen by each of the two subcommittees and fifteen by the committee as a whole). Given two sessions per experiment and two experiments, the total is 180 decisions.
The two sessions are defined in terms of the mechanisms that were applied to control the group choices (Condorcet Sessions and Chairman Sessions). Choice manipulation using the equilibrium or Condorcet winner design required information about all preferences. In the Condorcet sessions, the assignment of types and the alternatives allocated as the jurisdiction were chosen such that the sub-target for each subcommittee existed as a Condorcet winner. Each group target was accompanied by changes in committee preference profiles and alternatives such that a Condorcet winner existed and was predicted as the choice. Of course, the Condorcet winner is the core if it exists, but it is not always possible, or might be difficult to assign preference types and alternatives such that the sub-goal would be a Condorcet winner. Thus, the Condorcet sessions are a solid but limited test from the point of view of a testbed of the manipulation power of the mechanism.
From an institutional design and "committee karate" perspective, the Chairman mechanism has advantages over the Condorcet mechanism because under Chairman mechanism, the core always exists and finding an element of the core requires only information about the most preferred option by each participant as opposed to the whole preference ordering. However, it might not be possible to configure the institutions such that the core is exactly the target alternative.
In the Chairman mechanism sessions, the organizational configuration and the use of the closed rule procedures in particular, gave the Chairman special powers, interpreted as blocking powers in the model. That is, the chairman can be modeled as veto player, or, "blocking coalition" who becomes decisive only if joined by a majority. Possible design limitations are created by two features. First, the chairman's optimum alternative is always in the core but it could be the case that no possible committee member has the target alternative as an optimum.. Second, other alternatives can also be in the core. If a Condorcet winner exists, it is also in the core as can be alternatives that are "between" the chairman's optimum and the Condorcet winner. As a result, in the Chairman sessions, the core always existed but sometimes contained multiple alternatives that include the chairman's optimal, a Condorcet winner and possibly additional alternatives.
The testbed asks whether the chosen elements will be in the core and if so, which element. The Chairman sessions focus directly on the empirical issues by choosing targets and configurations in relation to targets such the target was always an element of the core. On some occasions, the chairman's most preferred was the unique alternative of the core and on others was part of a multi-element core. By defining the target to be the most preferred alternative of some member of the subcommittee and changing the identity of the chairman in the organization configuration from target to target the design created a test of the ability of the organization configuration to control the alternative chosen by the subcommittee.
For the Chairman sessions, the target alternative was changed across sessions while the committee jurisdictions and preference types remained unchanged in the two subcommittees. The configuration for Subcommittee 1 had no Condorcet winner and the core was sometimes a unique alternative, the chairman's optimal. By contrast, alternative A, the overall Condorcet winner, was always available for Subcommittee 2 and was always in the core for that subcommittee. This pattern of configurations provides a study of conditions when the Condorcet winner does not exist and the core is unique, when the Condorcet winner does not exist and the core is not unique and when the Condorcet winner does exist and the core contains the Condorcet winner together with other alternatives. Thus, the power of the Chairman mechanism and the core is tested under a variety of circumstances and the possibility that the core favors some elements over others, e.g. chairman's most preferred versus Condorcet winner, can be studied.
The Condorcet mechanism is structured such that the majority rule relation in each committee contains no majority rule cycles. However, due to ties the weak majority rule relation is transitive but the strict majority rule relation is not. Under the Condorcet mechanism, classical voting theory under the open rule suggests that in each committee an application of a simple version of Roberts Rules will lead to a choice of the Condorcet winner. Each subcommittee will choose the option the designer wants and the runoff vote between subcommittee choices will result in the desired outcome.
B. Committee Procedures
Initially, the default option, option O is designated as the motion on the floor. It is the least preferred option for all members. The motion on the floor is then amended through an amendment process that occurs in four stages.
Stage 1: Motions -During this 10 second stage, members may do one of the following: nothing; propose an amendment to the motion on the floor; or propose that the subcommittee recommend the current motion on the floor. Once the timer expires, a proposal will be chosen at random for further consideration as an alternative to the motion on the floor. Under the Condorcet mechanism, any member, except the proposer, may second the recognized proposal and bring it to a vote. If no one seconds the proposal, the process returns to the previous stage.
Under the Chairman mechanism, only the chairman of the committee has the power to second a motion. Thus, the chairman has blocking power in the sense that the Chairman is in all winning coalitions. However, the chairman alone is not a winning coalition.
Stage 3: Majority Rule-Any motion that passes by a majority of the committee members' votes, will pass. Voting was required.
Stage 4: Motions to end-Any member can propose a motion to end.
C. Preference Inducement
Traditional methods of using money to induce and control preferences were used. The control for long term strategies and interdependence of strategies among centers required rotations of the preference types and permutation of the alternative names/labels. These are reviewed in appendix 3.
Model Predictions
As outlined in Section 5, the testbed procedures reflect the underlying normative goals and theory of the organizational decisions. Tables 5 and 6 contain the targets, behavioral predictions, and the results.
The testbed environment has four features that challenge the design.
(1) There is a large number of feasible options (15), so an ability to predict a specific option must overcome any inherent randomness that might be reasonably expected to produce any outcome with some probability;
(2) The experiments are conducted in an environment in which the preferences of the entire collective have a Condorcet winner, which serves as a natural comparison. That is, if the agents were to engage in a majority rule process following Roberts Rules with open proposals and voting, the group deliberations would converge to an equilibrium -the Condorcet winner, which is alternative A. The Condorcet winner from among all alternatives is a natural outcome against which successful influence can be compared;
(3) The design depends on the reliability of subcommittee processes. If one of the subcommittees deviates, then the whole system can fail to hit the target; and (4) The core often has multiple elements, so theory predicts that the target option will not be chosen with certainty. Table 5 contains the predictions of committee decisions when operating under the Condorcet mechanism for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Each experiment lasted for fifteen periods (five configurations repeated three times) and the sessions that existed in a given period were the same in both experiments. Each period consisted of three committee decisions: Subcommittee 1, Subcommittee 2, and the Overall Committee consisting of the members of both subcommittees. The core and the target alternative were the same for both experiments for a given committee and a given period as shown in Table 5 . Under the Condorcet mechanism, the core and the target are always the same alternative. This is because in the Condorcet mechanism, the core is a single element and the flexibility of the design allowed a configuration of the parameters such that the core and the target coincided. Thus, the normative target was always the predicted outcome for the Condorcet sessions. Table 6 contains the predictions of committee decisions and the core of the underlying social choice model when operating under Chairman mechanism for both experiment 1 and experiment 2. Similar to the Condorcet sessions, each of the Chairman sessions lasted for fifteen periods (five configurations repeated three times)and the sessions that existed in a given period were the same in both experiments. Again, each period consisted of three committee decisions: Subcommittee 1, Subcommittee 2, and the Committee as a Whole consisting of the members of both subcommittees. The core and the target alternative were the same for both experiments for a given committee and a given period as shown in the table.
For the Chairman sessions, the alternative most preferred by the chairman is always an element of the core but a Condorcet winner is also an element of the core. Depending on the majority rule relation and the preference of the chairman, other alternatives can also be elements of the core. Thus, the core need not be unique as is illustrated in Table 6 . Shown there for all periods and all committees are all elements of the core with the most preferred of the chairman shown at the left and side of the list and the Condorcet winner listed on the right hand side. The core can be a single alternative as it is in periods 1, 2, and 3 of Subcommittee 1 but in all other cases the core contains more than one element.
The underlying conditions of the testbed together with the tools available for influencing the decisions placed limitations on the design. In particular, on occasion, without substantial reconstruction of committee assignments and jurisdictions, it was difficult to construct a configuration of the parameters such that the core was the single alternative designated as the target. However, the target is always a subset of the core. Table 6 lists both the target for each period and the core.
Given institutional constraints, it may not be possible to design a process that always results in a choice of the target alternative. Nonetheless, the resulting design inaccuracy can be readily anticipated and measured. In particular, as the core becomes larger, it becomes less likely that the target will be selected.
Specifically, consider the case of two subcommittees and let C i , be the core of subcommittee i and let x be the target alternative, which is one of the alternatives considered by Subcommittee 1. The measure assumes that the core occurs with certainty. Let Y be the alternatives considered by Subcommittee 2 that are in C 2 and also that x dominates in a majority rule sense and let  yY Pr(y| C 2 ) be the sum over the relevant events. Under those assumptions the theoretical accuracy is measured by design accuracy = [Pr(x|C 1 )Pr(C 1 )][  yY Pr(y| C 2 )Pr(C 2 )].
Given that the models predicting the core outcomes occur without error, the probabilities Pr(C 1 ) and Pr(C 2 ) are both 1 for purposes of this measurement. For the uniform distribution case where ties are ignored, the formula simplifies to design accuracy = (1/n)(k/m) where: n is the number of elements in the core of Subcommittee 1 (which has our preferred option x); m is the number of elements in the core of Subcommittee 2; k is the number of elements in the core of Subcommittee 2 that are dominated by x.
Note that if one of the subcommittees fails to produce the target alternative, then the overall target may be missed. Given our setup, even if Subcommittee 1 fails, as long as Subcommittee 2 succeeds, then the choice of the overall committee will be on target. This is because every option considered by Subcommittee 2 is preferred by a majority to every option considered by Subcommittee 1. Hence, the rate at which the overall committee is predicted to reach the target alternative is 33% in the Chairman sessions with three elements in the core and 50% when there are two elements in the core. There are two instances of two element cores and three of three element cores, so the hit rate is predicted to be 40% or a miss rate of 60%.
The results of the testbed and the outcomes of all experiments will be discussed in Section 8. The discussion includes design success and the accuracy of the underlying behavioral model, together with insights about the dynamics that became understood only after studying the committee behaviors.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects were students at the California Institute of Technology and were recruited for 2-hour sessions through laboratory subject databases and dormitory announcements. All subjects were inexperienced (participated only once). As a group, they had no knowledge of the complexities of social choice (the possibility of cycles, the existence of a core, etc.).
Both experiments were conducted via computer terminals in the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Talking was not permitted during the experiment and partitions existed that prevented clear views of other subjects. Instructions (Appendix 1) were printed, distributed, and read to all subjects. All values were stated in experimental currency units. Individual subject exchange rates differed across subjects but remained the same for a given subject throughout the experiment and were private information. Average earnings were $51 for the session ($1.70 average per decision).
Experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . Screenshots of the program are shown in Appendix 2. As stated in the instructions, options appear on the subjects screen from most preferred on the left, to the least preferred on the right. Subjects were also able to see a history of all past recognized motions and votes.
Results
Two classes of results are outlined. Section A addresses the reliability of the organization to manipulate the outcome as intended. Section B is focused on the dynamic processes at work. Three facts create a challenge for performance. First, the group had an overall Condorcet winner. It is the core given the majority rule dominance relation and is a natural equilibrium should the entire group be governed by majority rule without the subcommittees and the subcommittee procedures. Any successful design needs to overcome that tendency. Secondly, success of the design is defined by a single, desired outcome. Performance is measured as either 0 or 1. Furthermore, there are many alternatives in the sense that if the outcomes are random from among the alternatives then the probability that any one alternative would result is small, 1/15. So, any underlying randomness works against the design. Third, the process design consists of several separate processes and if one of those processes fails to function the performance will not be according to design.
The outcomes of experiments are reported in Tables 7 and 8 . Before reviewing outcomes, an example of the dynamics of a single committee process might be useful. The entire process for one period is contained in Figure 5 . The options are displayed in a two dimensional representation in a manner that maintains the consistency of a quadratic loss function in the sense that if the point of maximum is known for an individual then the preference between options is captured by the distance from the individual's location. Table 4 contains the details of the proposals and votes of the decision represented in Figure 5 . The first proposal to be considered is for option K, which receives a majority to become the new motion on the floor. Option L is proposed and passes. A motion to move to J fails and then alternative M passes. A motion to change the motion on the floor from M to K fails but a motion to move to J passes. With J as the motion on the floor several motions for alternatives I,H,K fail, as does a motion to end debate and choose J. A motion to move to L fails and a motion to end and accept J wins. The final committee choice is J.
A. The design worked.
As shown in Tables 7 and 8, the decision process performed substantially as it was designed to perform. Result 1 states that the performance of the system conformed to the design, but was imperfect. Result 2 explains that those imperfections were not due to a lack of reliability in the underlying theory, but instead a consequence of having multiple elements in the core.
RESULT 1: The organization systematically influenced the group choices to choose the target option. The Condorcet sessions were the most successful, followed by the Chairman sessions.
Support. The target alternative was chosen substantially more frequently than can be explained as random, which would have the target being chosen on the order of 6% of the trials. For subcommittees in the Condorcet sessions, 56 of the 60 trials (93%) resulted in a choice of the target. As mentioned above, the target success of the committee as a whole is sensitive to the target success of the separate committee decisions that constitute the choice of the committee as a whole. For the committee as a whole, with subcommittees operating in Condorcet sessions, 27 of the 30 trials (90%) resulted in a choice of the target. For subcommittees operating in the Chairman sessions, 32 of 60 trials (53%) resulted in a choice of the target. For the committee as a whole, with subcommittees operating in Chairman sessions, 10 of the 30 trials (33%) resulted in a choice of the target, which is on the order of the 40% hit rate predicted.
Result 1 says that the overall group choice was influenced by the organization as predicted.
Result 2 leads to a better understanding of the reliability of the tools. The question posed is focused on accuracy of the core. Given the alternatives available to a committee how well are the committee choices predicted by the core (as opposed to the target). The subcommittees have all of the assigned alternatives available but the committee as a whole has only the alternatives available that happened to filter through the subcommittees. In addition, the core has multiple alternatives. The result says that given the condition for the application of the theory, it does very well as a predictive tool.
RESULT 2: The system outcomes tended to be in the core of the dominance relation among the options available to the appropriate committee. When the core contained multiple elements, the winning alternative was not biased toward some particular alternative in the core such as the Chairman's optimum or the Condorcet winner. The tendency of the choice to include any element of the core, as opposed to just the target, resulted in proportionate degradation of design accuracy.
Support.
The choices tended to be the alternatives in the core. In the Condorcet sessions, the core (the Condorcet winner) was a single element and in those experiments, 56 of 60 subcommittee trials (93%) resulted with the only alternative in the core. Thus, under the Condorcet mechanism, the alternative targeted as the subcommittee choice was the choice. In the chairman sessions, 52 of 60 trials resulted with an alternative in the core. Of those 52 trials, 32 were the chairman's optimum (i.e. the target), 9 were the Condorcet winner, and the remaining 11 were additional elements in a multi-element core. These results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. Across both sessions, all binary decisions made by the committee of the whole were the core (the majority preferred option) of the two alternatives.
While the chosen alternatives were in the core the design accuracy was less than perfect because the core often contained elements in addition to the target alternative. Of the eighteen cases for which the core had one alternative (the target), 13 of the eighteen committee decisions were in the core (.72). When the core had two alternatives, there were 24 committee decisions of which 21 (.875) were in the core and 14 of 28 were the target (.583). When the core had three alternatives, there were 18 committee decisions of which 18 (1.0) were in the core and 5 (.277) were the target. The core was an accurate predictor of the outcome and among the elements of the core the target was chosen with about the same probability as were other elements of the core. Of course, whether this feature of proportionality is a general property or not requires additional theory and experiments.
The model accuracy of the committee when voting as a whole reflects the fact that subcommittees must chose the target alternative in order for the committee as a whole to choose the target. In the Condorcet sessions, the target alternative was the choice for 27 out of the 30 committee of the whole choices (.90). In the chairman sessions, the committee as a whole chose the target alternative 10 out of the 30 decisions (.333), which is in line with the special case accuracy prediction of .333.
Section B. Properties of Dynamics
The success of the core as a behavioral model leads to questions about the micro principles of decision and the properties of the dynamics. What types of voting and sequences of motions lead to the core? The results below suggest that non-strategic (myopic) models of behavior dictate the dynamics. In particular, Result 3 shows that the next step in a dynamic path of motions is dictated by the dominance relation. Result 4 shows that the myopic behavior stems from both the decisions to propose motions and from the voting behavior. If strategic voting was predominant, one might deviations from dominance.
RESULT 3: The dynamic movement of the motion on the floor follows the path of the dominance relation. That is, a motion to move the alternative on the floor to a different alternative succeeds if the proposed change is to a dominating alternative and the motion fails if the destination is not a dominating alternative.
Support.
Across all experiments, a total of 301 motions were made to change the motion on the floor to some other alternative. Of the 301 motions, 85 motions proposed movements to an alternative dominated by the motion on the floor. All 85 failed resulting in 216 movements of the motion on the floor. Of the 216 movements, 211 (98%) followed the dominance relation. The 5 movements that did not follow the dominance relation are discussed as errors in Result 5.
RESULT 4: Individual proposals and individual voting tend to be sincere (preference revealing).
Support. The sincere nature of proposals is supported by the fact that nearly every motion proposed is sincere in the sense that the proposed alternative is preferred to the motion on the floor by the proposer: 98.5% of motions (3928 of 3988) are for an option preferred by the proposer or to end deliberations. Moreover, proposed motions follow a predictable pattern: 62% directly follow the strategy of proposing their most preferred option not yet considered against the current motion on the floor. An additional 13% propose their most preferred option despite previous consideration. Another 11% propose their most preferred not yet rejected (a strategy that is rational in an environment without cycles). Thus, over 86% of motions are part of a myopic "hill climbing" ("sincere") strategy. Of the 60 insincere motions, 52 were made after a failed attempt to end with the individual's preferred option. This instance of insincerity can be interpreted as strategy to compromise on a slightly less preferred option rather than endure protracted debate that might end with an even less preferred option.
The voting on motions proposed also follows a pattern of sincere, preference revealing similar to proposals. Nearly all votes are sincere: 94.5% of votes (1422 of 1505) are cast for the preferred option and only 83 were not.
Observation 1: (evidence of dynamic strategies). Instances of insincere voting appear only under special circumstances. Of the 83 insincere votes, 60 are cast for O -the initial motion on the floor, which is everyone's least preferred option. The observation is that these votes for O may reflect a dynamic strategy to retain a "bad" option that has no chance of being chosen, while attempting to influence a motion in the preferred direction. Regardless, these individual votes were never effective in blocking an amendment.
Given the possibility of strategic behavior, it is useful to study the detail of instances in which the core model was inaccurate. The next result is that these exceptions to model predictions do not contain evidence that suggests they resulted from strategies more sophisticated than sincere voting.
RESULT 5. The core failed to contain the group choice in 11 of 180 committee decisions. These inaccuracies of the model reveal no systemic departure from the basic principles of sincere voting behavior that support the use of the core as a behavioral model. Support. (i) In 8 of the 11 model errors, the error reflects a premature termination in the sense that an agent voted to end without proposing a preferred alternative that had not been defeated by the motion on the floor. (ii) In the remaining 3 errors, 1 was due to insincere voting and 2 were due to the chairman seconding motions that were for a less preferred option.
The patterns of subcommittee (centers) behavior suggest that overall design created behavior consistent with the Independence of Infeasible Alternatives axiom. The setting of subcommittee decisions within the larger organization had no effect on subcommittee behavior. That is, information and incentives remained local.
Observation 2. Decision Centers acted with autonomy.
Support. The design produced no direct test of the axiom since preferences and committee jurisdictions systematically changed throughout the testbed. A direct test would require the jurisdiction and preferences in one center to remain constant while the changed in the other center. However, Results 4 and Result 5 amount to restatements of the axiom at the individual level. Individual decisions tended to be sincere. The decisions reflected only the immediate, local environment. The exceptions to sincere voting were few and exhibited no relationship with the preferences or options under consideration by the members of other centers.
The combined results indicate that the design did what it was supposed to do and did it according to the principles that lead to the design in the first place. Both Result 1 and Result 2 report outcomes that were substantially predicted by the model. Indeed, the accuracy is accurately predicted by the model. The success of the design cannot be attributed to accident or randomness. The reliability of the basic principles are supported by a study of the dynamics (Result 3) and individual behavior (Result 4). Behavior inconsistent with the model can be traced to specific errors of the model (Result 5) as opposed to some broad failure of the principles. Observation 2 connects the behavior with the most fundamental of the organizational properties that enable the success of the design.
The final observation addresses participant perceptions of bias. Is the organization perceived as biased in the sense that participants realize the purpose implicit in the organizational design and reject the organization as a result? A questionnaire distributed after the experiment asked the questions directly. It appears that the participants did not perceive that the group as a whole was manipulated by the organizational design and did not focus on the overall process as being unfair.
Observation 3. Participants did not regard the process as "unfair". Participants did not perceive the overall process as biased and to the extent that bias was perceived, it was confined to the detailed operations of a committee.
Support. Manipulation occurred equally in Condorcet and Chairman sessions, yet perceptions of fairness were narrowly focused on whether or not one person was perceived as having an advantage. Among the subjects 80% thought that the results in Condorcet sessions accurately reflected preferences and 55% thought that the Condorcet mechanism was fair. By contrast, 25 % of the subjects thought that the decisions in the Chairman experiments "accurately reflected preferences" and 15% thought that the decisions in the Chairman experiments were "fair".
From the perspective of implementation it appears as though the groups were unaware of the manipulation that took place. Thus, the operation of Committee Karate can proceed through the implementation of a process that appears fair but is not.
Summary of Conclusions
We studied groups of ten people, with fixed and conflicting preferences over fifteen alternatives. The environment contained neither money nor private goods. The research task was to design a system, a "mechanism", to manipulate the group to choose an alternative we wanted as opposed to the alternative that might otherwise be chosen. The tools used in the design are derived from axiomatic social choice theory and cooperative game theory. Experimental methods were employed following methodology for testing mechanism designs and addressing two key questions concerning the connection between observed performance and the principles used in the design. The key questions are: (i) did the system do what it was supposed to do -proof of principle? (ii) did it do what it did for understandable (theoretical) reasons -design consistency?
The group as a whole always had a majority preferred alternative. The research task was to develop procedures that would cause them to choose various alternatives (the target alternatives) that were ranked low in a (weak) majority rule order. Thus, the target alternatives were alternatives that one would expect would not be chosen by the group if left to its own. Five target alternatives were chosen. Two different sets of preferences were induced. For each target three separate experimental trials were performed. The testing is actually much more extensive since, as will be reviewed below, each trial consisted of three different committees, two subcommittees, and the committee as a whole.
The results demonstrate overwhelming support for the design success. The target alternative typically emerged thus establishing proof of principle. The cases where the target did not emerge as the choice were due to multiple equilibria and were also predicted by the model. Thus, design consistency is evident in the data. Furthermore, post experiment questionnaires suggested that the committee members regarded the process as fair and did not perceive to have been manipulated. In every respect, the committee karate seems to have worked.
What have we learned that a committee karate practitioner might try? The theory and data have not produced an optimal way to go about it but they do suggest a simple rule of thumb algorithm. Agenda theory suggests that the manipulation power is enhanced by a type of "divide and conquer" strategy that itself relies on limited coordination and communication within the group.
(1) Determine a target alternative, the alternative the practitioner wants chosen.
(2) Partition options and choose an option from each of the two sets such that one of the two chosen options is the target alternative and the second of the two options is one that the target option will beat in a majority vote of the committee as a whole (or by the committee that will be assigned to make a final resolution of choices).
(3) Key steps are the allocation of people to subcommittees, the appointment of a committee chairman and the designation of rules for the subcommittee decision process. The objective of the steps is for the two alternatives to be the respective committee choices. Use information about individual preferences to appoint committee members such that for each group the desired alternative is the core of the respective voting group. If the core does not exist then appoint chairpersons such that the alternative the designer wants to be the winner of subcommittee voting is the alternative most preferred by the chairperson. Give the chairperson blocking power, such as the unique power of a second or a power that prevents votes on certain proposals. This arrangement assures that the target alternative will be in the core of the implied game representation of the subcommittee decision process. (4) Make sure that the subcommittees are autonomous and that there is no cooperative voting across subcommittees and no side payments within a subcommittee. (5) Pass the subcommittee choices back to the group as a whole or designate a special committee to make the final, runoff decision. Since the two options emerging from subcommittee votes were strategically chosen such that the non-target alternative would lose in a runoff, the choice of the group as a whole will be the target alternative.
Manipulation appears in many forms and descriptions. The research presented here used manipulation as a framework for exploring key aspects of how organizations work within a formal structure. Thus, while the idea of committee karate or manipulation carries with it a tone of Machiavellianism or antisocial theory, the opposite can be the case. On such matters, the science is morally neutral. The theories can be used for manipulation as well as for tools for protection against manipulation, hidden agendas, and poorly designed decision processes. This paper simply illustrates that cooperative game theory and axiomatic social choice theory can be added to the design toolbox.
Appendix 1: Software, Procedures and Instructions
A. An outline of committee procedures
A history of past proposals and their results is maintained for all committee members to review as deliberations take place.
Motion on the floor: The process starts with the default option as the motion on the floor.
Recognition: When stage opens participants have 10 seconds to choose an option and seek recognition. A random selection is made from those who seek recognition.
Proposed Amendments: The participants recognized submit their selected alternative as an amendment to the motion on the floor. If the proposal is seconded it is presented for a vote. The proposed amendment is highlighted for all to see and understand that it is proposed.
Seconds to proposed amendments: Under the Condorcet mechanism, seconding of the motion can be done by any committee member other than the member that made the motion. Under the Chairman mechanism, only the chairman can second motions. The floor remains open for 5 seconds or until seconded. If there is no second, the proposed motion fails. The previous motion on the floor remains as the motion on the floor. If the proposed amendment is not seconded, the system returns to the Recognition Stage.
Voting: If the amendment is seconded, the screen changes color (orange) to indicate that a vote is to take place between the proposed amendment and the motion on Ending debate: During the recognition stage, a motion to end debate can be offered. If recognized, it must also receive a second, which can be done by anyone other than the person making the motion. If the motion to end debate is seconded then the screen asks "We now vote on the motion on the floor. Would you like to end the amendment process and accept the motion on the floor as the committee decision?" Subjects must choose yes or no. Pass is determined by majority. If no, the system returns to the Recognition Stage.
B. Instructions

Purpose and Payoffs
You will participate in an experiment on group decision making. You will be a member of a committee that must choose one letter from a set of letters. Only one of the letters will be chosen and the payment you receive for participation depends entirely upon which letter it is. People's preferences for the letters may differ, so the letters you prefer may not be preferred by others.
Preferences
On your screen, the letters are ordered from your most preferred to your least preferred.
Here, L is your most preferred letter, I is your second most preferred letter, and so on. Below each letter is your payoff in experimental currency should that letter be chosen as the committee's decision. Thus, if L is chosen as the committee's decision, you will get 400 in experimental currency; if K is chosen, you will get 150. Your exchange rate from experimental currency to dollars is located in the top left. This member's exchange rate is 100, so a payoff of 400 would amount to $4.
Other members may differ in their orderings, payoffs, and exchange rates. For example:
Her exchange rate is 25 and her most preferred alternative K has a payoff of 75, which is worth $3.
Procedure
In order for the committee to choose a letter, it must follow some rules of order. Initially, -The committee is split into subcommittees -Each subcommittee is assigned a subset of the letters from which they must choose a recommendation. All recommendations go to a final committee that chooses among the recommendations as the committee's decision via majority rule. -It is this final decision on which your payoff depends, not the subcommittee's decision.
-One letter O is designated as the initial "motion on the floor" (which can be considered the subcommittee's tentative decision).
The subset of letters from which your subcommittee can choose is depicted via outline. Specifically, the letters your subcommittee can choose between in the example above are L, I, B, E, A, F, K and O. The motion on the floor is O and the subcommittee will have an opportunity to change the motion on the floor through an amendment process.
Amendment Process
Initially, the floor is open for proposals and all members may propose an amendment to the motion on the floor by selecting an alternative letter. This proposal stage will occur multiple times. After the timer expires, only one proposed amendment will be chosen for further consideration. So if multiple people submit a proposal that lowers the chance that your proposal is considered by the subcommittee at this stage. But suppose that you are the only person submitting a proposal -then your proposal will definitely be considered. During the seconding stage, the proposed letter will be bolded and all other letters deemphasized. If you were the proposer, the box is blue. Otherwise, it will simply be bolded. Anyone except the proposer may second the proposal. If not seconded within the time limit, the process returns to the proposal stage. If seconded, all members must choose whether or not the proposed amendment should become the motion on the floor. If not, the existing motion on the floor remains.
History
Throughout the period, a history of all proposals made and their votes is displayed in the bottom left.
As other members vote, their votes are displayed in real time. After each vote on a proposed alternative, the process returns to the proposal stage. In the example above, the majority of members voted for the proposed amendment B over the initial motion on the floor B, so the motion on the floor has changed to B. If the timer expires and no member has proposed an amendment, the next proposal will be immediately considered.
Ending a Period
During the proposal stage, members may also propose to end the amendment process by selecting the motion on the floor for consideration as the subcommittee's recommendation. If the proposal to end is seconded, all members must choose to either accept the motion on the floor or continue the amendment process.
However, remember that while your subcommittee was choosing between a subset of letters, the other subcommittee was choosing between the other subset of letters. After both committees have recommended a letter, the committee as a whole will vote between the two recommendations. Again, your payoff depends entirely upon the decision by the committee as a whole.
Ties in the Committee as a Whole
In the event of a tie, the voting process will repeat itself, but a timer will begin to count down during which members may revote. If the timer expires and the committee still has not reached a decision, O will be the committee's decision. If a decision is reached, everyone is paid accordingly.
Multiple Periods
The entire process will be repeated over multiple periods. In each period, you will have different preferences, but you will retain the same member number and exchange rate. You will be paid the sum of the profits you make in each period.
Phase 2: Introduction of a Convener (Committee Chairman)
Similar to the previous phase, any member can propose an amendment. However, one member will be designated as a convener, who has the sole power to second a proposed amendment to the motion on the floor (except their own, which must be seconded by someone else). That is, you will only vote on proposed amendments seconded by the convener. Proposals to end and accept the motion on the floor differ in that any member may second a proposal to end (except the proposer).
In the top left of the screen, you will be notified whether or not you are the convener.
Second -The proposed motion is bolded (and the other options deemphasized). If a subject that was not the initial proposer chooses to second the option, it proceeds to the next stage of voting. Otherwise, when the timer reaches zero, it returns to the previous Propose stage. 
Vote -Th choose o becomes
Preference Types and Preference Inducement
A preference type is an ordering of the 15 alternatives. There are ten different types, contained in Table 1 , each of which is assigned to a subject and induced as a preference in a given period. Figure 3 is a two dimensional spatial configuration of the ten types, with the numbered boxes as the location of the maximum for each type.
For example, the preference ordering of the alternatives for Type 1 is in the first row of Table 1 and has alternative L as the most preferred, G as the second most preferred, D as the third, etc. with the least preferred alternative for Type 1 being the alternative O. Type 1 is also illustrated in Figure 3 , where the box containing the number 1 is the spatial location of the optimum for Type 1 and the further the letter is from the optimum the lower is the level of preference. As shown, alternative L is the closest to the Type 1 optimum and the location of alternatives G and D are further, indicating that they are less preferred. All individuals have alternative O ranked lowest and thus alternative O is not shown in Figure 3 . Table 3 , the Subject Value Schedule, contains for each subject the monetary value of the fifteen alternatives given as a function of the rank of preference. For example, if the committee's decision is a subject's most preferred alternative, that subject receives a payoff of $2.50. If the decision is the subject's second most preferred, the payoff is $2.33 and so on. Each step has a difference of 16.6 cents. For example, if the committee's decision was L, the subject with Type 1 would receive $2.50 while Type 3 would receive $1.83 and Type 6 would receive $0.33.
The Assignment of Types to Subjects for Experimental Design and Testbeds
The experimental design, outlined in Section 6, calls for two subcommittees. Each of the two subcommittees is assigned a subset of the fifteen alternatives. The status quo, alternative O, is available to both subcommittees as the default of no decision. In the experiments studied here, each subcommittee considered seven alternatives plus alternative O. Each subcommittee has five members and no one serves on both subcommittees. Thus, the ten subjects are partitioned into two subcommittees of five members each.
Each of the ten types contained in Table 1 is assigned to one of the two subcommittees and will become the preference ordering of a committee member. The committee's mechanism -simple Roberts Rules or Chairman -together with the five preference types and seven alternatives, are sufficient to determine the dominance relation discussed in the theory of Section 6.
Rotations and Permutations
Two procedures were employed to avoid the possibility that the assignment of types to subjects carried information about the environment and the possible preferences of other subjects. First, the letter assignments were permuted each period. That is, the letter assigned to the original alternative A became some other letter, such as F. Second, whenever the same environment was repeated, the types were rotated among the same subjects. For example, subjects 1,2,3,4,5 would be assigned types 3,4,6,9,10 in one repetition and 4,6,9,10,3 in another. Figure 1 Organization Chart -Each subcommittee is assigned a subset of options and members. From among the options assigned, each subcommittee makes a choice. Then, the committee as a whole (the set of all members) makes a decision between the two choices. If we let the matrix represent the dominance relation for simple majority rule and represent the preference for the chairman, we derive the dominance relation for the game. An option is undominated if its associated row only has nonnegative values; hence, in the example above, the core is the pair , . Within each session, both subcommittees and then the committee of the whole vote 15 times. Those 15 votes are composed of 3 repetitions of 5 configurations (described in Table 5 and 6). Subjects with preferences induced by monetary incentives vote following the organization and rules imposed for the design. The tests are designed to reveal the influence of the organization and the accuracy of the models that predict the influence. In all, 20 subjects made 180 decisions. of Committee options ( ) (≺) show wh Note that th e dynamics o es from the f unanimous v ach member prefers L to o J (7) , fails t ucceeds to e e Processthat are spa hich options here are two of the commi figure are re ote) is to K ( ). From K, it o J. It procee to move to I nd at J (13) .
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Member Type Table 5 Experimental Configurations for Condorcet Session-For each configuration, a target option is selected and an assignment of members and options to subcommittees is determined such that the core of each subcommittee contains the target. In the Condorcet session, the core is unique, so the target and core are equivalent. Within each subcommittee, there is a strict Condorcet ordering among the options (there are no cycles or indifference among the options). The options are presented in the sequence of the strict Condorcet ordering. Table 6 Experimental Configurations for Chairman Session -For each configuration, a target option is selected and an assignment of members and options to subcommittees is determined such that the core of each subcommittee contains the target. In the Chairman session, the assignment of members and options to subcommittees remains the same throughout all configurations: (i) all odd-numbered members (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) and options H -N are assigned to Subcommittee 1, and all even-numbered members (2, 4, 6, 8, 10) and options A -G are assigned to Subcommittee 2. The only change between configurations is the identity of the chairman. Note that the core is not always unique and that within Subcommittee 2, the option A is preferred by a majority to all other options (but is never the chairman's favorite). The target is always the most preferred alternative of the chairman for that subcommittee. The options are presented in the sequence of the chairman's preferences. Table 7 Results for Condorcet Session -The results are listed in the "Outcomes" columns. The core was unique in every configuration, so the expected accuracy is 100% (30/30). The results closely match this prediction, with an accuracy of 90% for Subcommittee 1, 97% for Subcommittee 2, and 90% for the overall committee. Table 8 Results for Chairman Session -The results are listed in the "Outcomes" columns. The core was not unique in every configuration, so the expected accuracy is not necessarily 100%. Instead, if we assume that each element of the core is equally likely to be chosen, then when there are two elements, the expected accuracy is 50% and when there are three elements the expected accuracy is 33%. Across configurations, we get an average expected accuracy of 80% (24/30) for Subcommittee 1 and 40% (12/30) for Subcommittee 2. The target for the overall committee is always the target of Subcommittee 2, so we also have a 40% (12/30) average expected accuracy for the overall committee.
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